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Thesis.

Property Rirlhts of Mari'ied Vomen

with

Special Reference to the Legislation in New York.

Charles P. R Zan,

C o rn

e

i 1

U n i v e r s i t y,

School of Law,

Leg:inning in 1331.) 'ississippi leading, the legis-

latures of the several states of this Union have been

gradually but sulely re,

which have

virlp

the legal disabilities

oppressed mar,--ied %-[omen throughout the

mon law system of jurisprudence, since

com-

the introduction

of the Teudal System...

As a

result

of this ler:islation

married women's

statutes, so calleci, are to-hay univel-sal.

utes of the various

states,

These stat-

thov<h having for their de-

sip:n the accomplis hment o" t1!e sare general object,

abrogation of all

power of control on the part of the

husband over the wife's Fproperty,

form in

their

the

provisions.

are by no means uni-

The purpose of this essay is to trace:

briefly the

rules governinr the propert,, rights of ,,iarried women

as they existed at common la, and in equity;

dy as closely as an article

and to stu-

of this character will pe'-

itt)the effects of the more important married viomen's

separate property acts which have emanat, d from the Leg-

islature of _.ew York.

The Common Law System.

Personal Property in Possession.

At cormmon law marriage vests in

the husband an

ab-

solute title of all the wife's personal property which is

in possession.

This is

true whether the wife has ac-

tual or beneficial possession;

whether the property is

that of the wife at the time of mav'iape,

or subsequently

becomes hers by gift, bequest, purchase or as a result

of her labor.

it,

with or without

her title

-ain

The husband may make any disposition of

consent

to this property is

of the wife.

forfeiteu

ania she

it

only by the will of hei- husband.

If

the wife survives

the husband,

tion has been made of thds property,

Once

it

arried,

can re-

and no disposi-

passes to the

husband's pe 4sonal representatives.

Choses in Action.

Marriage

gift, to

acts not as an absolute

but as a

qualified

;.he husband, of the wife's choses in action.

To make his

title complete he must reduce the choses

to possession auring coverture.

in case he dies before taking the steps necessary

to reduce them to possession she,

and not his pe 'son-

al representatives, is entitled to the property.

If

the aif. dies belsure the husband leavinf- choses in action,

unreduced to possession durinr coverture,

the husband, as such to make them h&,s own,

the ripht of

ceases.

Lut by the statute of 29 Charles II. he was entitled to

administer on her estate, and as her administrator to

recover and re.uuce to possession all her cho.-es in ac-

tion, if any, still outstanding and after first paying

therewith any debts contracted by her before marriage,

to retain the

1r'sidue as his own property.

Wlienever it becomes necessary for a husband to seek

the assistance of a court of equity to obtain -ossession

of his wife's choses, Equity in pursuance of the maxim

that "he who seeks equity must do equity" will compel

hiq to make a suitable provision, for his wife and her

chiluren, known 's the wife's equity of settlement.

Chattels Real.

£lie husband has a qualified interest, also, in the

chattels real

without-

of his wife.

ier consent,

The law gives him power,

to sell, mortgage or otherw-ise

dispose or incumber the same at his pleasure.

Chattels real unappropriated during coverture vest

in the wife absolutely after the death of the husband.

if

the wife dies bef re the husband their go to the hus-

bznd.

in thnis respect they resemble choses

in action.

Lut an important distinction exists between the right

by whi;Ii

the husband claims,

at

the death of the wife,

choses in action unreduced anu chattels real unappropri-

ated.

The former,

we have seen,

go to the husband in a

iepresentative capacity', while the latter vest in the

husband as such.

statute

lHe does not hold tl evi by force of

as aaministrator the avails

of which are to be

applieL to the pau'mnet of his debts.

his

own;

it being one of his marital rights that his

wife's chattels real, upon hei'

hii-i

;.e holds the-.,, as

death shall belong to

absolutely.

T.,e chattels real may also be levied upon under ex-

ecution for the debts

ture lasts.

ferrea to

By this

of the husband wiile

the

process the title becomes

the creditor;

-nd

the wife is

cover-

trans-

permanently dis-

possessed of her chattels real, even though she s hould

survive her h-sband.

if

the husband makes a lease of the wife's term and

before expiration of the lease aies, the per-sonal rep-

resentatives

of the husband .re

Though the husband

hams been held

.ake

that

a

lease,

to the rent.

cannot prevent

by will

of her chattels real if

enjoyment

it

entitled

the wife's

she survives hir.,

made b'r the husba-d

still

to

effect imeuiately upon his death, is valid, and

the wifes interest is barred until the termination of

the lease.

Real Property.

The

hiusband acquires by marriage the usufruct of all

the freehold estate of the wife.

property is

a freehold.

such

During their joint lives he

takes absolutely the rents,

crue during coverture.

"As estate in

issues and profits

that ac-

if unreducea to possession dur-

ing coverture, he may maintain suit to recover rents and

profits which had accrued while coverture lasted.

1:

unreauceu durinpr

his life,

they pass

to his Personal

representatives, the wife not beinp entitled to recover

them.

ThouEh the husband's

estate

is

interest in his wife's real

liable for his debts,

the husbant's u;s)fruct

is

still nothing more than

11or can

thereby affected.

any disposition of the property b,, the husband or his

In case

creditors defeat the wife's ultimate title.

the real estate of the wife is converted, durin7 her

life, into personalty bY voluntary acts of the parties

such personalty becomes tie

rope- ty of the husband.

If the .iif- survives, she is aain the sole owner

of her lands, and the heirs and personal representatives

of the husband have no interest

dea.th,

the husband

surviving,

in

-hem.

At

the wifeIs

no child having been born

capable of' inheriting,

the husband's

interest ceased.

But if such child has been born, the surviving husband

becomes vested with a life interest in all her lands,

known as his curtesy estate.

Sur'viving Wife's Rights.

The question now arises, what interest did the wife

Fain. by marriage, in the property of her husband?

vested interest was acquired;

No

but ti]arriage did at once

confer upon her an inchoate right in his estate which be-

caz:e consumate at his death, she surviving.

This was

the well known provision termed dower, consisting of a

life estate in one-third 7art of the real property of

inheritance of which the husband was seized at any time

during coverture,

right of dower.

in which the wife had not conveyed her

It was not necessary, as it .ias in case

of curtesy, thIt-

a

chilci should actually have

and while the husband might have

a

been born;

rif-ht o-" curtesy

in

trust estates, le-al seisen wras necessary to support

a O

1].

it

will be seen that this

estate of the wife dif-

fers materially from the cui-tesy estate of the husband.

in

addition to dower,

mained in

aas entitled

force till

the

by the comron law :hich ree-

reip-ri of Charles

tu one-thif'd, and if

he

left

to one-half,of her husband's personalty.

1. the widow

no children

!7uccessive

statutes changea tilis so that at the begin :ing of the

eighteenth century a husband could bequeath his entire

pe;-sonal

estate if

he desired.

This sulmxlary inaicates,

1 think,

the clianres effected by marri--,F:e in

it outline at least,

the prOperty rig:hts

of womeln at Goiii,-on lavi.

For almost a century' after

Elackstone few essential alterations were made bY leg-

islaTeiven

Euaettmennt.

The Equitable Doctrine.

As a result of these harsh, inflexible and,

cases,

unjust principles

ways anxiuus

of trusts

between

of the conmon law,

Equity,

many

al-

to prevent haruship, interposed the doctrine

and ei-abled a woman oA-0 her friends

her ana her husband a

band could assert no riphts in

property cofiveyed

of the ;wi.'e.

be created at

before

any time,

o-" aurill-'

necessary;

to the

This estate may

coverture;

any kind of prorverty, real or personal.

ticular fomn of words is

to place,

trustee against whom the hus,

"sole and separate use"

and in

in

No par-

but an intention to

exclud> the husband must be unequivocally expressed.

If no

trustee is designated, a court of equity will de-

clare

the husband a

cormion law

iill

trustee,

and his marital

rights at

be dis-)laced by his duties as

trustee

in equity.

in

rlution

to her spearra~e

tion wouleu be entirely

cormion law.

changed

ier cont-acts,

estte

the wife's

posi-

from that ass i-rned at

void in

a court of law,

v oula in a court, of equity be valid and enforceable

against her spearate

Dstte.

Although, as is %iell known,

a wife could no* sue o-,- be sued at covrmon law,

in

equity

in regard to her separate estate both could be done.

This doctrine

teenth century,

(Drake

vs.

oripinating as early as the four-

was .;ell

Storr,

settled

2 Freem.

205);

in

England

and was

in

1095

enforced there

and in this country, under proper circumstances, until

legislation rendered its application no long;er necessary.

Under the Statutes

Although j:ississippi

late

of Ne,'z York.

aas the first

un this question,

missive and lacked the

her act of 133 .

libe>':l

state

to leIis-

.-jas merely pe-

features which has char-

Several states soon

acterized subsequent-le,islation.

joined the movement notable among themfor completeness

of change being

In

-Paine and Mlichigan which acted in

!Lew York the

p'operty rights

first

radical

change

of married women was made

affecting the

in

1843.

vious to 1840

theire had been a str'ong public

feeling

that

shoulci be relievd'

the wife

1344.

Pre-

of an opprlssive lg

which placed her, as regards property batte's,

in a posi-

tion extremely inferior

to that of her husband.

Cunstitutional Convention which sat

prominent

topic of debate,

In

the

in 1346 t.his was a

and the substance

_f the

sub-

sequent act of 1343 was at one tie incorporated in the

:roject

of the new Constitution but was finally defeated.

Public sentitnent was by no means

action of the convention.

The advocates of reform in

this direction brought their

instance

This Act

umore

influence

to bear

the Act

of 134L

sweeping in

its

of 1343.

(Laws

of 1843,

provisions

ch.

200)

was far

than had been the leg-

islation in any state prior to this time.

guished all

on the

the result of that influence being in th.

legislature,

first

smothered by this

It extin-

the comnon law rights (,f the husband in

spect of the wife's property.

re-

Henceforth the wife was

15
sole owner of all property, real and personal which

she should own at marriiare,

comes hers

by any title

and of' all

which should be-

during coverture.

to divest rig-hts alread

it attempted

vested in the husband under the

cormnon law, but this provision provea ineffectual being

declared unconstitutional and void.

Gregg, 12 2]. Y.,

202;

Westervelt vs.

Ryder vs. Hulse, 24 1.

Y.,

372.

This Act was amended by Laws of 1849, Chap. 375

and though now in the main superceded by later statutes,

it has influenced subsequent legislation in this -and

other states and is

to-day frequently cited by the courts.

Curtesy.

By the third section of the

'Jas empowered

husband,

original Act, a wife

to receive from any pef'son, other than her

property of any description;

but no power to

dipose of that propei'ty was given her, leaving the hus-

band's claim at her death precisel'y as it was before the

statute.

The Amendment

of 1349, conferred upon the wife au-

thority to "convey and devise real and pe'sonal property,

and any interest or estate thel'ein, and the

rents, is-

sues and profits thereof in the same manner and with like

effect as if she were unmarried."

This plainly gave the

wife power to defeat the husband's right

of curtesy if

any such right remained.

It

was at first

(Eillings vs.

declared b,

Billings,

ing an exhaustive

2

opinion,

Yrb.

tat

the Supreme

343)

Potter,

the husband's

Cuurt,

J.

writ-

curtesy

right had been entirely abrogated by the statute.

However plausible the reasoning of Justice Potter,

when a

few years

later

the question again came

before

the Supreme Court a different rule was enunciated.

ratter

2 Lansing, 21.

of Winne,

In this case the court

say it cannot be denied that the legislature possessea

the power to deprive the husband

of all

oris and as tenant by curtesy initiate,

of the husband to the

serve the ri-ht

right

jure Ux-

and still

pre-

tenancy to cur-

tesy consumate.

This is

in

accordance with the weight

and in Hatfielu vs. Sneden

(54 37.

Y.,

of authority;

230) the law is

saia to be substantially settled, that while the Acts

of 1843 and 134

,

excluded the husband during life

from

control of or interference with his ;ife's separate real

and personal estate and gave her alone the

position by deed or will,

yet they left

power of dis-

him tue

right of

curtesy in

h:r real property a-cL of acministration

his own benefit of her personalty in

for

so much as remained

at her death undisposed of and unbequeathed

.

safely be saiu to be the law of this State,

respecting

Tis

may

curtesy, to-day.

A . re"'a-'ds the jife's

case on this point

holds,

personalty the most recent

(Robbins vs. i-c Clure, 100 1'. Y. 323)

that where a ma -iicd woin dies intestate and leav-

ing no descendants, the rule of the common law is still

in full force and the husbanu is entitled to the person-

al estate of his wife, undisposeu of at h- r des th,

by

virtue c. his marital right, as well as his right of ad-

.inistrat ion.

7Vr ere descendants

are

left,

the husband

ta: es t_-e saie portion of his deceased wife's

as his widowi woul

be entitled

Ransom vs.

Uic>

2.,rnes vs.

Unde-,.,wocd,

is,

2.

11. Y.
47 1].

to in

i10.
_.,1

3.51.

like

personalty,

cases.

f-iannei- of Charrinr wife's "'state.

it has been state

that previous to legislation a

-arrieu woman's contracts made in

arate

estate

'aere binding

branch cf the

entire

in

reference

equity.

to her

Still,

sep-

on no

subject under consideration,

has

there been Creater conflict of opinion, both in equity

and, until a recent date, under the statutes than as to

what acts

of the wife

,iould bind her property.

Lishop treating generally of this point says:

11r.

"Since

the confusion of tongues at the Tower of Babel, there

has been nothing more noteworthy,

the discordant

dicial mind

in

the sai'e line,

than

:nd ever shiftinr utterances of the ju-

on ti-is subject."

iarly applicable to the decisions

This remark is pecul-

in

!ev

York.

The great authority prior to the statutes was the

case of Jaques vs. 1L1ethodist Episcopal Church.

Mothodist Episcopal Church vs. Jaques

As

(3 Johns. Ch. '73)

it came before the Chancery Court in 1817.

Here Chan-

cellor Kent in an elaborate opinion, after an exhaustive

review of the English cases,

hulds that a married woman

can charge her separate estate onlr -ihen power to so

in the instrument creating- her separate

charade is given her

estate.

This doctrine of 'ent was subsequently over-

ruled in

the Court

of Errors

(17

Johns.

543)

the

where

position is taken that a married woman may act as a

feme sole

in

respect

to her- separate property, except so

far as she is restr'ained by the instrument in which the

estate

is

created.

This

:.ule,

,,,ith considerable

rigor,

was applieu by the courts until 1848.

Under the statutes already noticed it was clear

that the liability

could be onforced when c-'eated in

rying on a trade or business of the wife,

Iolland,

to,

56

.

.,

422);

o.

,here

the

car-

(Frecking vs.

contract related

oi, was made for the benefit of' hei, separate estate.

(Owen vs. Cawley, 30 !'..Y.,

N. Y.,

600;

Ballin vs. Dillaye, 37

$5.)

When the debt was one not contracted on her own

account,

Aor he-

separate estate,

own benefit or for the benefit of her

the rule in

,his State though adopted

deliberately by the courts was far from satisfactory.

On this question, the case of Yale vs. Dereder has been

under the statutes what Jaques vs. Methodist Episcopal

Church was under the equitable

i'58,

in

18' !.

Y. , 265 this

theory.

celebrated

feginning in

and much crit-

icised case has three times reached the highest

court of

the State.

At its

first

consideration

it

was decided that

order for a marr-ied woman to charge her separate

with a debt not contracte

tate,

it

charge

estate

for the benefit of such es-

was necessary that there

an intention thus to

in

it,

should be evidence

and that

obligation was not sufficient evidence.

of

a note or other

In

22 N.

Y.,

450, its second appearance, Selden, J. held that the in-

tention to chage the separate estate must be declared

in the very contract which is the foundation of the chare.

The

last appearance of this case is in

Church, C. J.,

333 '. Y.,

329.

writing the opinion of the court follows

the ' -evious decisions, though doubtinF their propri-

ety,

and says:

question to

"There is every reason for referring this

the legislative power, to detelmine definite-

23
ly what rule shall finally prevail."
This suggestion was not acted upon until 1384, when

b-Y Chap. 381 of the Ljaws of that year the following is

provided:

Section 1.

extent,and

A married woman may contract

cjith like effectand

in

the

to the same

same form

as if

unmarried and she and her separate estate shall be lia-

ble thei-eon, whether such contract relates to her sep-

arate business or estate or otherwise, and in no

case

shall a charge upon her separate estate be necessary.

Wife's Right of Compensation for Services.

Lavrs of 1860, Chap. 90, as amended by the Laws of

1862,

Chap.

172 supercedes

the Acts of 1343 and 1349 and

was evidently drawn so as to avoid the unconstitutional

feature noticed in the Act-of 1848.

Section 2 o-' the Act provides:

carry on any trade

A married woman .ay

or business and perform any labor or

services on her sole and separate account, and the earn-

ings of any married woman, from her trade,

bor or service shall be hel

and

nal

business, la-

sole ana separ:ate property,

be usea or invested by her in her oven name.

To quote from Judige Earl (93 N. Y.,

2,4),

the purpose of those provisi ns to secure to

woman, free

f'om the

"It

was

a married

control of her husband, the earnings

and p.'ofits of her own business and of her own labor and

services,

carried on and performed on her sole and separ-

ate account, which at commi-on law would have belonr--ed to

her husband. "

What constitutes

"earnings of any married woman from

her trade, business, labor or services" within the mean-

inm of this statute is often a question of importance,

not

to the husbanu and wife alone,

tive creditors.

i,-ay independent

Certain it

of

labor the profits

is

ier husband

but to their

respec-

that a rvar'riea woman

engage

in

any business

of which are her property,

free

or

from

all claims of her husband as such and from her husband's

creditors.

lo doubt attempts

-,are frequently made to

use this statute as a protection against claims of the

husband's creditors, and property is conveyed to the wife

as compensation for services wihich, if creditors were

not interested, would b. considered unworthy of compen--

sation.

These colorable transactions find no favor

with the courts

and trnsfers

of property from husband

to wifc as recompense for services rendered in their

home,

though made

in perfect good faith, have at the

suit of the husband's creditors

A case

Here,

to

been declared void.

in point is Coleman vs.

Burr'.

an action was broupht by defendant's

iet asiae a deed made by defenaant

throurh.
a Tpihj*

person,

on the ground that

(C3 N. Y. , 17).

creditors

Bui'r to his wife,

the deed was made

to hinder, delay and defr-aud creditors.

The

consid-

eration -or the conveyance was the wife's services in

caring for the invalid mother of the husband.

eree found that the services were

irksome and laborious

and the transaction was fair a -i honest.

declared the conveyance voidsaying:

a

vife renders

in

The court

"VIlhatevecr

her home for her husband

on her sole and separate account."

The ref-

services

cannot be

While it

may be

asserted that were a different construction put upon this

and similar contl- cts,

the temptation to perpetrate

fraud

would be too apparent and

the;

too available to be resistecl,yet

injustice of the decision in this case must be ad-

mi t e .
Vit'iker

vs.

Whitaker,

52 IA. Y. ,

Reynonlds vs. Robinson, 64 N.

'here

creditors

are not

368.
53().

.,

interested

the tendency

is to allow the husband to relinquish to his wife his

right to her' earnings,

in

his own household,

can hold them to her separate use.

Gay,

14 N.

Y.,St.

Rep.,

Conveyances

I.-tter

betw.-een Husband and ,'life.

that a wife may

real and personal property in the same

manner and with like efect as if

Court of Appeals

of Kimmzer and

618.

Alth .ugh the Act of 1349 cteclares

convey and devise

so that she

in

she were unmarl-ied,

two cases held

her power to make a deed airect

that

this

the

did not give

tc her husband.

White vs.

Wagner 25 E. Y. ,30;

423.

it

Peebles, 32 N.

Winains vs.

was aduitteQ

that

there was undoubtedly an in-

tention to confer upon the iwfe, in respect

ances

of her property,

Y.,

the legal

to convey-

capacity of -a fame sole;

but as tnis precise question could not arise in respect

to a feme sole

it

was thought that

such a

conveyance

could not be permitted.

This doctrine was narrow and

frequently evailed.

the courts

of this

when by Chap.

till it

itechnical

and was

was never repudiated by

State and remained the law until

537 of the Laws of that year it

1337

'.ias ,-ro-

vided:

Section 1.

Any transfer or conveyance of real estate

hereafter made by a married man directly to his wife,

and every transfer or conveyance

of real estate hereafter

made directly

by a marr'ied woman

to her husband,

not be invalid because such transfer

made directly

or conveyance was

firom one to the other without the

vention of a

shall

inte.-

',hird person.

Estates by the Entirety.

It

in

a

is

a familiar principle

conveyance

that

of lands to husband and wife jointly,

they do not take as tenants

ants;

of the common law,

in

cormrnon nor as joint

ten-

but each becomes seized by the entirety, per tout

et non per *ay, and upon the death of either the whole

remaine

to the survivor.

Soon after

the passage of the Acts of 1343 and 1349

the courts were called upon to decide whether these Acts

had changed the common law in this respect.

With re-

newed force it was insisted that the Act of 1860 had com.

Thi s

pletely abrogated the coimmon law entirety estate.

latter

Act provides

that all

-,arried woman "bv descent,

grant---

property which cones

devise,

bequest,

shall notwithstanding her !.,arriage,

main her sole and separate property,

invested by her in

collected and

not be subject to

husband,

the

or liable

Court that,

be and re-

and may be used,

hei' own name,

interference

or

and shall

or control of her

for his debts."

For many years

i-fe

gift

to a

it

was uniformly held by the Supreme

notwithstanding

those Acts,

the husband. and

took as tenants by the entirety as at cor.mon law.

National

lister,

Bank vs.

- Hun,

in

1379

Gregory,

519;

Miller vs.

the question,

siaered by the

4b

Barb. , 165;

Iiiller,

for the first

Beach vs.

9 Abb.

time,

Pr.,

was

Hol-

444.

con-

Court of Appeals in '.Iecker vs. Wright

(70 N. Y. , 2(32) where it is discussed in an opinion by

Judge Danforth.

He held that inasmuch as tho Act of

1800 gave the wife sole and separate management and own-

ership, of her property,

free from the husband's

or interference, and free

the entirety

,'rom his debts,

was abolishcd.

It

of Dertles vs. Nunan (92 N. Y.,

control

tenancy by

remained for the case

152) to settle perma-

nently this questior, under the existing: statutes.

e

the question was directly 1rsented.

of the statutes

consi.eration

comnon law,

a majority of the

vs.

of-Meeker

spect

to estates by the entirety

unchanged.

"The

After a thorough

and their

effect

court repudiate

Wright and determine

trine

the

Here

on the

the doc-

that in

re-

comi-on law remains

comn.on law incidents

of marriage"

say

the Court, "are swept away only by express enactments.--

Ve fail

to

find any reason for holdinig that the corntion

law rule as to the effect of a conveyance to husband and

wife has been abrogated. "
Zorntlein vs.

Actions

Erai-,

12.

by and against a Married Woman for

An univers;al

for "tort

100, N. Y.,

rule at corn .on law was

"orts.

that in

actions

coririitted by or against a marrieu woman the

iisband must be joined with the wife" and

in

all

cases

the husband compensated or received compensation.

The Act of 1860 Chap. 90, Sec. 7, amended by Laws of

1362, Chap. 172, was the first to

change this principle.

This Act authorizea and permitted a married woman to sue

and be sued in

all

matters

relatinf

to her spparate prop-

erty, and to bring and maintain an action in her own name

or damages against any person or body corporate for any
--

injury to her person or character the same

were a feme sole.

vs.

Smith,

torts

Y.,

4b 11.

to her property.

relating

230; Baum vs.

Mullen,

47 N.

Y.,

Though she could not sue her husband for an in-

577).

jury to her person

(Schultz vs. Schultz, 3; N.

reversing 27 Bfun, 26),

141 it

shie

Under this statute she could sue and.

be su.ed alone for all

(Rowe

as if

was held that

for a tort

yet

Y.,

C44,

in Ball vs. Bullard, 52 Barb.,

to damages

the wife was entitled

comrrritted on her person by one

other than her

husband and that the husband was not a proper party plain-

tiff.

Lais

of 1330,

Chap.

245,

repealed

Ball vs. Bullard ceased to be authority.

could now sue or be s.ed for a

tort

it

Section 7, and

If' a wife

must be by vir-

tue of Section 450 of the Uode of Civil Procedure which

in 1379 was amended to read as follows:

"11n an action

o r special

cutes,

proceeding

prose-

or uefends alone or joined with other parties

if she was single.

jo-in

a married woman appears,

as

It is not necessary or -roper to

ler husbanu. with her as a party in

any action or

special proceeding affectinC her separate property."

In

Fitzgerald vs.

Quann

(109 N.

Y.,

441)

which was

an action to recover for an injury caused by the slan-

derous words spojken by the wife, the Court of Appeals

held that the cormion law liability of the husband for

the torts of his wife had not been abrogated either by

express

legislation or by the provisions of the

Civil Procedure.

This -positionwas reiterated

Mangam vs. Peck,ill N. Y.,

in

401.

On the other hand, after hopeless

Supreme Court

Code of

conflict in the

(Ball vs. Burleson, 40 Alb. L. J.,

305;

Campbell vs. Perry, id.,

350),

the Commission of Appeals

in an ingenious opinion insist that Section 450 of the

Code

gives a married woman power

for an injury to her person.

N.

Y.,

584.

to maintain an action

Bennett vs.

Bennett, 116

This placed the husband in the incongru-

ous position that while he had been steipped of the

former rights acquired by marriage,

he was still

liable

as previously for the wife's torts.
I
Fuarther doubt or' contention is

10)L,

Chaps. 51 and 248.

ariried woman shall have a

abated by Laws of

Chapter 51 provides that a

right of action for injuries

to her person, her property or character and arising

out of her marital relation

in all cases where an un-

married woman or a husband now has a right of action by

law;

that the husband shall not be liable

in damages

for his wife's wrongfful or toi-tious acts,

nor

for in-

juries to persons or property caused by the acts of the

Ylife,

unless the '-cts wei-e done by actual coeicion or

instigation of the husband and in all cases embraced in

the second section the ,,ife shall be personally liable

Chapter 248 which

for her wrongful or tortious acts.

takes effect Settember 1st,

1890,

amends section 450

of the Code of Civil Procedure so as to make it

improp-

er to join the husband with the wife in an action brought

by or a;ainst the wife for a tort,

r-ecovered in an action

and makes all

sums

as damages to the person, estate

or character of the wife, her separate proper-ty.

Few changes are now necessary to place a married

woman,

a

in

respect

ferule sole.

to property rights,

on an equality with

As the courts are reluctant to construe

37
the existing statutes beyond their clearly

import,

it

devolves upon the Legislature

-xpressed

to remove the

remaining oppressive principles of the comnon law;

and

in so far as consonanit with justice, and the unity of

t-arital relations their removal is inevitable.
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